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Abstract— Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is receiving a 
great attention by different communities (e.g. military and civil 
applications) thanks to its self-configuration and self-
maintenance potentials. Securing MANET is a very critical 
matter as it is vulnerable to different attacks and also it is 
characterized with no clear line of defence. Since any security 
solution relies on a particular trust model, there are different 
types of trust models that could suit MANETs. This Paper 
present a design of security architecture based on the hybrid 
trust model. Our security architecture caters for improving 
services availability and utilisation.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1) 
Nowadays, Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) [1] [2] is 
receiving a great attention by different communities (e.g. 
military and civil applications) thanks to its self-
configuration and self-maintenance potentials. It basically 
consists of a set of wireless mobile nodes enabled to 
communicate dynamically on the fly in multi-hop manner 
without any pre-existing network infrastructure 
(infrastructure- less). Unlike cellular networks and WLANs, 
every node participating in this network takes two roles 
simultaneously; it becomes a router to handle packets routing 
to other nodes and an application node (i.e. a user or service 
provider) to handle its own communications. Apart from 
that, each node is able to join and leave the network freely, 
and this renders its topology to change frequently [3] [4]. In 
fact MANET has a number of challenging properties. Its 
resources for example are stringent as majority of its nodes 
are low-end devices normally powered by battery. On the 
other hand, MANET also exploits the current wireless 
technology (e.g. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and IrDA) that already 
operate with limited bandwidth [5] [6]. 
Like any networking system, security of MANET is 
perceived from different points such as availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, authentication, 
access control and usage control [6]. However, Securing 
MANET is a very critical matter. It is vulnerable to different 
attacks and also it is characterized with no clear line of 
defence. This is because of open wireless medium used and 
number of particular constraints in its properties: limitation 
in resources capability, intermission in communication and 
lack of physical protection. On the other side, variant in 
security requirements of MANET’s applications is 
considered one of the challenges for deploying security 
solutions. For instance, depending upon the network 
purpose, its security requirements in the military settings 
vary according to the encountered circumstance. 
Confidentiality and availability are the most important issues 
in a battlefield, whereas in a humanitarian rescue mission 
scenario, availability is much more required than 
confidentiality. Therefore, the security requirements in every 
case stem from the tackled application context.  
 
The trust is very important term which most security 
services (e.g. authentication, authorisation and etc.) rely on 
in their deployment. Therefore, in literature there are several 
trust models that their mission is to describe how to manage 
trust relationship between entities. Those models can be 
organised into two prominent approaches:   
1- Models based on Third Trust Party (TTP), where 
TTP is a special entity (i.e. a fixed server) trusted 
by all the other entities. The credentials (certificates 
and/or keys) are issued by a single authority like 
PKI (public key Infrastructure) [7], or Kerberos  [8] 
(or a group of special servers – collaboration 
between nodes to establish trust in the network – 
using for an example threshold cryptography [9]) .  
2- Model based on Self-organisation or Peer-Trust, 
where security does not used any trusted authority 
or fixed server, the models based on trust 
propagation through a trust graph (PGP [10]). On 
the other side, schemes that are based on the 
reputation concept, where trust is amended 
according to the nodes behaviour are considered 
one of self-organised model for establishing trust.  
 
This Paper preset a design of security architecture based on 
the hybrid trust model (i.e. combination of centralized and 
distributed models). It consists of a set of servers emulating 
certification authorities in order to manage certificates of 
joining nodes and help them in authentication.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
section-II, we give an overview of related works. In section-
III, we present our propose security architecture for 
MANET. We end this paper with a general conclusion. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section reviews trust models in both wired networks 
and MANETs. Trust Model is categorized in three main 
classes: centralized models, partially distributed models, and 
entirely distributed or self-organized models. 
A. Centralised Models 
 
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) is still acknowledged one 
of the most affective models for managing digital certificates 
(issuance, revocation and distribution) to trusted peers. 
Those certificates are essentially used for deploying security 
services, such as authentication, authorisation and digital 
signatures and encryption [7]. PKI relies on TTP (Third 
Trust Party) so-called CA (Certification Authority) the 
trusted entity in the system. In addition, PKI has been 
developed for wired networks and some infrastructure based 
wireless networks where there is no serious problem in 
connectivity and availability. It is noticeable in the PKI 
domain that security and scalability issues of CA are 
considered very crucial as CA is required to handle a large 
number of requests effectively.    
Similar to PKI, Kerberos [8] developed by MIT is a 
centralized TTP-based trust model. The TTP is here referred 
to a KDC (Key Distribution Centre) which holds all shared 
secret keys for user and server principles. The role of 
Kerberos Service is to become the trust reference in the 
system. Kerberos shares different key-secrets with each 
entity in the network, and it creates session keys which are 
used among users and servers.  
B.  Partially Distributed Models 
 
In [9] L. Zhou et al. proposed a partially distributed 
certification authority (CA) based on scheme of (k, n) of 
Threshold Cryptography (TC). The role of CA is distributed 
among specific nodes: servers, combiners, and a dealer. 
Servers and combiners perform signing public key 
certificates for users. The dealer is a particular server which 
holds the completely private-key certification authority. For 
any joining node, if all partial signatures are collected, it can 
then compute the complete signature locally to obtain the 
complete public key certificate. However, [11] Raghani et al. 
suggested a similar solution but this solution introduces an 
approach how to dynamically adjust the value of the 
threshold when required, and by this means decreases the 
certification delays. 
In [8], S. Yi et al. adopted the TC–based scheme. They 
describe how to select particular nodes according to their 
best physical security and capability so as to be MOCA 
servers (MObile Certification Authority). Also 
communication overhead in this solution is apparently 
reduced by using the technique of caching routes to MOCA 
servers. The system utilises unicast instead of flooding when 
sufficient cached routes exist. 
In [12]  Luo et al. proposed DICTATE (Distributed 
CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness for ad 
hoc networks). The DICTATE architecture presents a 
hierarchical CA between one mCA (mother CA) in wired 
network, and a group of dCAs (distributed CA) in MANETs. 
the group of dCAs  relies on  the TC scheme for signing a 
certificate of joining node. Nodes in MANETs can 
cooperatively be isolated from the mCA, but always have the 
need for CA's services. The mCA delegates a group of dCAs 
in order to increase the availability of security services when 
mCA is offline or out of reach. 
In [13] B. Wu et al. proposed SEKM (Secure and 
Efficient Key Management in mobile ad-hoc networks). In 
SEKM, the CA trust is distributed to a group of nodes, which 
could be nodes with normal or better hardware in a mesh-
based topology. SEKM the same as MOCA is designed to 
offer efficient share updating among servers and to quickly 
reply to certificate updating. For efficiency, only a subset of 
the server nodes initiates the share update phase in each 
round. A ticket based scheme is developed for efficient 
certificate updating. 
In [14] Omar et al. devised a hybrid trust solution called  
NetTRUST (mixed NETworks Trust infrastRUcture baSed 
on Threshold cryptography). NetTRUST exploits two sets of 
a particular CA for managing PKI: central CAs (CCA) in 
wired network, and mobile CAs (MCA) in ad hoc network. 
MCA servers emulate the CA role by using a (k, n) scheme, 
and the CCA servers delegate the CA role to MCA servers 
by using a (t, m) scheme. The system leverages 
decentralisation, supports nodes mobility, and resists against 
MCA failures. Also this solution introduces the usage of the 
standard X509v3 certificate issued by CCA or MCA and 
demonstrates how to get benefits from the powerful 
attributes of  X509v3 in this context, for more details in [14]. 
C.  Entirely Distributed or self-organisation Models 
 
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) [10] is a completely 
distributed model which was created, by P. Zimmermann 
targeting Internet. PGP is developed to be a substitute to the 
conventional PKI based on trusted authorities in order to 
offer free practical security solution to protect low value 
communications, such as emails. The fundamental part of 
PGP is referral certification which enables multiple users to 
“recommend” a certain user (i.e. work as an introducer) by 
signing certificates of its public-key. PGP adopts a system, 
called “Web of Trust” which mainly facilitates and manages 
key distribution. However, this scheme has a drawback 
making it vulnerable because, for example, dishonest users 
may issue false certificates to cheat other users. 
Based on the same idea of PGP, In [15], [16] Capkun et 
al proposed a self-organized trust model for MANETs, in 
which trust among nodes is maintained through physical 
contact. In this model every node issues public key 
certificates to those who trust from its own domain. Nodes 
are able to authenticate each other with chains of trust 
regardless of the network partitions and without any 
centralized services. This model includes all required 
algorithms (e.g. the Shortcut Hunter algorithm) to facilitate 
the initialization and authentication process, and nodes are 
expected to store as many certificates as possible. In this 
model, trust is established from “offline trust relationships”, 
which are created from general “social relationships”. 
In [17], H. Luo et al. proposed, for MANETs, a 
completely distributed certification authority model, based 
on threshold cryptography. The model distributes share 
among all nodes at the time when they join the network.  
When a new node wants to access to get its certificate, it 
sends a request to its k neighboring nodes for partial 
certificates. If the coalition decides that the requesting node 
is a “ well-behaved node” , they issue their partial 
certificates. These partial certificates are then combined 
together by the target node to create the complete certificate 
using an interpolation function. On the other hand, Trust is 
maintained by the notion that all the nodes must observe the 
direct neighbors behavior, and maintain their own CRL 
(Certificate Revocation List). In case, a node discovers one 
of its neighbors is dishonest, it adds its certificate to the list 
of revocations and disseminates through the network an 
accusation. If the certificate of accusatory is revoked, the 
accusation is ignored. Otherwise, the node is marked suspect 
by all the nodes receiving the accusation. 
III. OUR PROPOSED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE  
 
In this section, we present our architecture and the 
framework how to evaluate it.  
A. Motivation and Objectives   
Our proposal is targeting a large scale MANET where 
there should be a hundreds of nodes joining the network in 
order to utilize offered and available services (e.g. video 
streaming, internet gateway etc.). On the other hand, we 
assume that MANET nodes are limited to mobile devices 
(smartphones or laptops) but there is a fixed server equipped 
with a wireless interface. We may consider this fixed server 
as an access point between the infrastructure-based network 
and MANET. The network can undergo disconnections and 
partitioning due to nodes mobility and churn (i.e. joining, 
staying, depleted, failure and leaving). The main aim is to 
define a trust infrastructure which fulfills the following 
properties:  
 
 Maintaining higher availability and better scalability 
to security services. 
 Improving the performance and efficiency of 
security services (an optimal round trip time or 
delay).  
 Providing an appropriate level of protection through 
securing nodes and their communications.  
 Adaptable to network partitioning and resources 
limitation. 
 Offering flexible topologies of authorities. It means 
in regards every joining node has different 
Central Authority CAS 
Distributed & Delegated Authority TAS/DAS 
MANET 
New Node  
Space & 
Density 
Traffic 
Model 
Routing 
protocols 
Mobility 
Model 
Channel 
Type 
Node 
Churn 
Req to join  
MANET 
parameters 
Fig. 1. Our proposed architecture 
Authentication Protocol   
alternatives to be chosen in order to authenticate and 
obtain its certificate.  
 Efficient certificate management (issuance, 
revocation, renewal).  
B. Overview of Our Proposed Security Archicture   
 
Our proposal is to come up with a novel security solution 
to handle trust and authentication in MANET efficiently and 
effectively covering different levels of operations (e.g. an 
application layer). This solution is practically describing how 
to make use of available different prioritized alternatives for 
trust models (e.g. centralized or distributed models) under 
particular settings of MANET. As shown in fig.1, those 
settings come from both MANET features and the scenario 
taking place, for examples, the type of network mobility, 
nodes churn and routing protocols etc. Our proposed security 
architecture consists of three main components as following: 
 
1- Central authority Server (CAS): so-called the root 
authority is the highest trust entity. Despite the fact that 
the centralized trust model has a single point of failure; 
we adopted it for our solution as a vital part of a 
combined solution because we believe this model has 
good potentials to exploit in term of administration. On 
the other side, this central server is usually fully 
protected and well-equipped. CAS in initialization 
phase generates security keys and issues the required 
root and delegated certificates.  Also it is responsible to 
elect Threshold authority Server and create and update 
their partial shares when it is necessary.  Finally CAS 
performs authentication for the joining node by issue its 
certificate when it is reachable. 
 
2- Threshold authority Server (TAS): this server has a 
partial part of private key own by CAS in order to use it 
in signing partial certificates. It normally creates and 
updates a partial certificate for the corresponding 
calling node. TAS is arguably available when CAS is 
offline. Node which has its certificate from this type of 
server must combine it with other partial TAS’s 
certificates based on the (k,n) threshold cryptograph 
scheme. A subset of TASs actually represents the 
distributed trust model in this regard as shown in fig.1.  
 
3- Delegated Authority Server (DAS). This server 
managing his own certificates. It creates certificates to 
the accessing nodes by using its own signature and 
attaches them with its CAS delegation certificates. 
Therefore a node which authenticates to this server gets 
the certificate chain in order to be able to validate and 
use to access to the available services within the 
network. Apart from that, we propose that TAS takes 
the task of DAS, in other words, one server node has 
two TAS and DAS services. This is because TAS 
server is already elected with high confidence by CAS. 
Which in turn reduces the overhead of performing 
election again and also TAS usually has a capability of 
running these two services.        
 
On the other hand, the priority of trust models (i.e. server 
models) in this context is characterized and determined by 
two measurements, availability and a level of trust. We 
develop a priority list grading options of using the three 
types of servers: (1) CAS; (2) TAS; (3) DAS. The new node 
starts calling CAS first. In case CAS is not available, it 
moves to the second option of calling k TASs. If the calling 
k TASs fails to satisfy k answers, it picks one of reachable 
TAS to call the DAS service to get certificate chain.  Every 
successful call of the option in this list is recognized with a 
distinguishable certificate which has a different level of trust 
as shown in fig. 2.  
Eventually, the main purpose of our proposal is to 
maximise services utilisation, the more nodes have their 
certificates, in other words, they are authenticated, the more 
nodes are motived to get involved in operating MANET and 
exploit offered services. On the other side, using different 
levels of trust in the certificate would offer flexibility and 
security to the service providers. This is by enabling them to 
manage and control their service access according to these 
levels, for an example, a service provider sets a access policy 
to accept only the certificate issued by CAS from the calling 
node for safety reason.     
Fig. 2.  The Trust Level of Certificate issued by different servers.  
IV. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK  
 
In this paper, our focus is on the trust models and 
infrastructures in both MANETs and wired networks. We 
present the three different categories: centralized models, 
partially distributed models, and completely distributed 
models. We then propose security architectures which 
provide a different subset of servers to work as certification 
authorities (e.g. CAS – Central Authority Server; TAS – 
Threshold Authority Server; DAS – Delegated Authority 
Server).  These servers are to facilitate authentication to 
nodes in the network and issue node’s certificate 
characterised with different level of trust. Our security 
architecture caters for improving services availability and 
utilisation. The next plan is to create an experiment approach 
to evaluate our architecture using a simulation. Simulation 
study of this architecture is currently under way, using the 
network simulator OMENT++ [18] . 
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